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Abstract
As a step towards studying human-agent collectives we conduct an online game with human
participants cooperating on a network. The game is presented in the context of achieving group
formation through local coordination. The players set initially to a small world network with limited
information on the location of other players, coordinate their movements to arrange themselves
into groups. To understand the decision making process we construct a data-driven model of agents
based on probability matching. The model allows us to gather insight into the nature and degree of
rationality employed by the human players. By varying the parameters in agent based simulations
we are able to benchmark the human behaviour. We observe that while the players utilize the
neighbourhood information in limited capacity, the perception of risk is optimal. We also find
that for certain parameter ranges the agents are able to act more efficiently when compared to the
human players. This approach would allow us to simulate the collective dynamics in games with
agents having varying strategies playing alongside human proxies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Understanding cooperation and conflict in digitized societies is becoming increasingly
important with the introduction of artificial intelligence or agents as actors in human social
networks. Human-agent cooperation has been lately realized in diverse scenarios ranging
from health care settings, to retail stores, to self-driving cars [1, 2]. The task of forging
cooperation or coordination between humans and agents in complex environments requires
the understanding at different levels, such as the psychological underpinnings of human
preferences, as well as anticipating the dynamics from human-agent collective action [3–5].
While the answers are far from simple, the use of online games to study hybrid human-agent
systems seems to provide valuable insights [6, 7]. For example, Shirado and Christakis [6]
studied how the collective performance of humans trying to solve a coordination game on a
network changes in the presence of agents (or bots), and showed the impact of the degree of
randomness in agents’ behaviour on the outcomes.
In studying the dynamics of human-agent collectives in games, one needs to investigate
the dynamics of groups composed solely of humans, followed by modelling human intuitions
and reasoning, such that the latter model can be used for simulating human-agent hybrid
systems. In this work, as a first step towards understanding a hybrid system, we develop a
cooperative game that is played by human subjects on a virtual network. First, we observe
how large groups can emerge, using the concept of a connected cluster of nodes. Then we
construct a probabilistic model that captures the human decision making pertinent to the
game, and simultaneously allows us to analyse the bounds on rationality and cognition of
the players.
We choose a framework that is in the spirit of the earlier works by Kearns et al. (see [8] and
references there in). In a series of experiments they studied the effect of network structure on
the efficiency of solving problems like the graph coloring and consensus by human subjects
[8–10]. They also showed that the amount and quality of information in the system that
is available to the subjects influences their performance, depending on the structure of
the network over which the subjects are interacting. Our game also has similarities to
the extensively studied matching problem that considers two distinct sets of individuals,
like, men-women, producers-consumers, and employers-job seekers, from which members
get matched in pairs to their own mutual benefit [11, 12]. The latter problem has also been
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studied by Coviello et al. [13] in the form of a distributed coordination game on a network
where players get rewarded when all the nodes get matched in pairs. They found that human
subjects participating in the experiment tend to behave prudently while averting risks, and
this behavioural trait influences strongly their performance and capabilities to complete
the expected goal. The complex relation between network properties, human behaviour
and collective performance in problem-solving tasks has been explored in different works
[14–16], and it has been shown that coordination, cooperation, and other social interactions
within human groups can be described and analyzed through carefully designed experiments
involving human subjects. In the current set-up the players are incentivized to arrange
themselves in groups rather than pairs. Closely knit groups or communities are ubiquitous
in the society that act as chambers of collaboration and innovation across diverse fields
of human endeavour like performing arts, science, and technology development [17–20].
Therefore, the game can be also placed in the context of game-theoretic studies of social
group formation, for example, games [21, 22] that are based on Schelling’s segregation model
[23], and more generally, hedonic coalition formation games [24, 25].
During the rounds of the game the players coordinate their actions in pairs by communi-
cating over the network links, and exchange their locations or node positions. We focus on
the problem of complex decision making by human players linked with others in a network,
where the players have information at the local and global scales, i.e. colours of their neigh-
bours and cluster sizes, respectively. The model is able to explain the decision making in
terms of the perception of risk by the players, as well as the cognition of their neighbourhood
information. The model also provides insight into possible situations where excessive caution
by the players would hinder their mobility and aggregation behaviour aimed towards group
formation. On the other hand the lack of prudence or cautiousness would allow the groups
getting fragmented. Finally, we use our model to scan the parameter space and compare
other possible strategies with the strategy employed by humans.
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FIG. 1. A game with 24 players. Starting from a graph-colored configuration, neighboring
players exchanged places over 11 rounds, after which a solution is achieved, i.e. after the 11th
round the three largest clusters belonging to each colour have reached the maximum size of 8.
Within a given cluster (for a given colour) any pair of nodes will have a path exclusively through
the nodes belonging to the cluster. The colours attributed to the subjects are shown in the figure. In
addition, links that connect the players in a given cluster are marked with the corresponding colour
while the other links are shown in gray. Only rounds with odd numbers are shown and denoted by
the label ‘rnd-’. The largest cluster size for each colour at the end of the corresponding round is
indicated as a triplet (Sr,Sg,Sb) with Sr, Sg, and Sb being the largest cluster size corresponding to
red, green, and blue, respectively. The network consisted of a regular squared mesh of 6× 4 = 24
nodes, with periodic boundaries and three small-world links. The average of the largest cluster
sizes of the three colours is scaled by the maximum value (8) and expressed as a percentage is also
indicated for each round.
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II. METHODS
A. Game rules
Human subjects playing the game are grouped into m classes having l individuals in each
class, such that in sum there are n = ml individuals. A class is denoted by a colour, e.g.,
red, blue, green, etc. The game is played on a connected network of n nodes. Each one
of the n nodes of the network is occupied by only one player, hence there are no empty
nodes in the network. The goal of the experiment requires that by swapping places during
successive rounds, players end positioned on the network with m clusters each of size l. A
connected red cluster implies that from any red player any other red player can be reached
by a connected near-neighbour path consisting of only red players (see the last network in
Fig. 1).
The game is played in rounds, and in each round players decide on exchanging their
locations with other players in the network, in a requesting-accepting process. In each round,
one of the m colours is chosen, and players having this colour act as requesters. Players
having other colours receive the possible requests. Each round consists of two distinct stages:
a first stage with requests being sent by players of the chosen colour, who want to move
from their current locations. A requester can send a request to only one of the neighbouring
players who has a colour different from its own (therefore, players of the same colour can not
exchange places among themselves). In the second stage, acceptances occur, where those
players who received requests in the previous stage from the requesters, decide on whether
to accept or not, one of the received requests for exchanging places. If a request is accepted,
those players involved (i.e. requester and acceptor) exchange their locations in the network.
After all the possible exchanges are made, the round ends. In the next round a different
colour is chosen for the requesting activity. The colour chosen for the requesting activity on
each round changes in a cyclic way, such that in m rounds, each of the m colours have been
chosen once. The rounds continue till the goal is achieved or the number of rounds reaches
the maximum limit, whichever happens earlier.
During each round, a player is provided the following information:
1. The colour of other players in the neighbourhood.
2. The size of the player’s own cluster.
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FIG. 2. The graphical user interface for the game during requesting (left) and accepting
(right) stages. The focal subject (“YOU”) is able to view the entire network but the colour of
nodes that are not immediate neighbors are masked. Links to the neighbors that have colours
different from the focal subject are shown in magenta and links to subjects having the same colour
are shown in dark grey. Other links are shown in grey. Buttons allowing to choose between options
are displayed above the network. Adjacent to the neighbouring nodes the following two numbers
were provided – (i) an identifier for the node location, and (ii) the cluster size of the neighboring
player located at that node (within brackets).
3. The size of the cluster of each of the neighbouring players.
4. The largest cluster size for each of the m colours.
5. The average collective progress (ACP ) defined as the average of the sizes of the largest
cluster in each colour normalized by the maximum possible size l. In case m largest
clusters reach sizes l the ACP is 1.0 (desired outcome).
The game is terminated once the desired outcome is reached, i.e m clusters of size l are
generated, or after a fix number of rounds T , where T is a multiple of m, which allows all
the colours to have the same number of rounds to be requesters. Incentive per game is based
on a score that is calculated from the ACP (see the following section).
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B. Experimental setting
The experiment was conducted in a single session, in a computer lab at the Department of
Computer Science of Aalto University located in Espoo, Finland, on the 9th of August, 2017
with 30 individuals recruited from an online volunteer pool and from advertisements in social
media. Before the experiment all the subjects were provided with information sheets as well
as sheets for informed consent. The informed consents, once signed by the subjects, were
collected before the experiment began. No personal information of the subjects was collected
other than contact emails for rewarding purposes. To help the participants understand
better the game dynamics and its rules, a short explanatory visual presentation was given
in the room to all the groups and, before the sessions started, each participant played a trial
game lasting 6 rounds to ensure that the subjects got acquainted with the user interface of
the game. During the sessions the presentation file was accessible to the subjects on their
desktop. The file is available in the supplementary material (SM). The interface and engine
of this online game was implemented using the oTree framework (Fig. 2) [26]. Subjects’ view
of other workstations was restricted and all communication during the games was forbidden.
During the four-hour session, a total of 9 games were played, consisting of five games with
24 players and four games with 30 players. We ensured that during each of the first 5 games
(24-players game), six of the thirty participants would skip exactly one game. For each game,
the network consisted of a regular squared lattice (4 × 6 or 5 × 6) with periodic boundary
conditions. We had three additional long-ranged links (not resulting in triangulations) to
introduce a small-worldness. In every game the positioning of these links were altered. Also
the places of subjects at workstations were shuffled between games. The networks used in
the game can be considered as realizations of the Kleinberg model [27] in the limit that
small-world links appear independent of distance. The time given to the players to make
a decision (either requesting or accepting) was changed with rounds progressing, being 30
seconds during the first 5 rounds and 20 seconds during the rest.
The incentive offered for participating in the experiment were movie tickets, sent to the
players by email after the whole session was completed. For a given network topology and
initial positioning of subjects we also calculated the quantity ACPrand from simulations
where agents play randomly. We obtained a normalized score for each game by scaling
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FIG. 3. Example showing how the model assigns probabilities to an agent in the requesting mode
in a given neighbourhood. (Left) Hypothetical instance of a neighbourhood around a focal agent
with label i. Agent i’s color is blue. Agents iii, v, vi and viii are immediate neighbors of agent i.
The sizes of the cluster to which each agent is connected is shown to the right of each agent. Note
that agent i has 2 neighbors of color red (agents iii and viii), a neighbor of color green (agent vi),
and one neighbor of the same color (agent v). (Right) Probabilities calculated using the model
according to which i selects one of the 4 possible choices (ω), namely to send a request to one of
the agents iii, vi and viii, or to not send any request and retain its place in the next round.The
last option is denoted by ω(0), and represented by P0 in the model. The parameter values αr, βr,
δr, and λr are taken from Table I.
ACP with respect to ACPrand and accumulated the total score (S) over 9 games as
S =
9∑
k=1
ACP (k)− ACPrand(k)
1− ACPrand(k) .
To each subject one movie ticket was given for participation and 4 × S (nearest integer)
movie tickets were given as reward.
C. Model
During the game the players take decisions on sending (or not sending) requests and
accepting (or not accepting) requests based on the available information of their immediate
neighbourhood, and the sizes of the largest clusters of each colour. The decision making
logic employed by the agents is expected to be heterogeneous yet far from random. It is
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known that exact coordination between two agents is possible in the presence of common
knowledge [28]. However, in this game the knowledge of a subject and any of its neighbours
do not completely overlap. We construct a model that is based on the notion of probability
matching [29–33]. This model is expected to serve both the purposes of uncovering the
decision making logic of the subjects as well as act as template for agent based simulations.
For an agent i having a colour ci we assume that its neighbourhood S can be uniquely
characterized by the following quantities – (i) the current cluster size si, (ii) the set of cluster
sizes {sj}, where j is a neighbour of i having a colour different from i, that is, cj 6= ci. We
place all the neighbourhoods S that have identical supersets {si, {sj}} (or that can be made
identical by the ordering of j’s) into a given category C.
In a given category C we consider an agent i with the set of neighbours {j1, j2, j3, ...} that
have colours different from i. In the requesting phase it has to choose from the following set
of options ω: {stay at current location without sending a request, send a request to j1, send
a request to j2, ...}. We assume that with each option ω the player associates a probability,
Pω of it being beneficial to the progress of the game. Here beneficial may refer to an increase
in the cluster size for the colour of i, or increase in the cluster size for colour of j, or both.
Therefore, using probability matching, the probability of choosing an option ω is given by,
pω = Pω/
∑
ω′ Pω′ . Restricting ω to the set of options when a request is sent one can write,
pω =
Pω/P0
1 +
∑
ω′ Pω′/P0
,
where P0 is the estimated probability that not sending a request (that is, not moving) is a
beneficial option.
Next, we focus on different categories that could be realized during the course of the
game, and for each category we identify the cases (characterized by neighbours with cluster
size sj) when one or more requests were sent from the focal players i to players j. These sets
are indeed options that were actually executed. Thus in each category and for each option
ω(j) we accumulate the total number of cases (Nω) when a request was sent. Additionally, in
the same category we accumulate the total number of cases (N0) when no request was sent,
and calculate the ratio (Nω/N0)/(1+Nω/N0), where this ratio lies in [0, 1]. Taking this ratio
as the dependent variable we perform a logistic regression on the following set of variables,
(i) si, (ii) sj, and (iii) Uj with data from all chosen ω’s from all categories. The quantity
Uj = 〈s(cj)〉 − sj, where 〈s(cj)〉 =
∑
k=1,ni(cj)
sk/ni(cj) is the average of the cluster sizes of
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the ni(cj) neighbours of i that have the same colour as j. We use this difference Uj as the
measure of disparity that a focal player could possible recognize in the neighbourhood in the
requesting mode. A large value of this difference might encourage the focal player to send a
request to a player having colour of j, so that clusters having colour cj could merge. There
could be better measures of disparity but our choice is guided by the linearity of the model.
For the actual fitting instead of Uj we use 〈s(cj)〉 as sj is already an independent variable.
Although we base our model of decision making on probability matching, it could as well
be considered as a log-linear response model [34, 35]. The fit to a logistic function allows us
to use the following expression for a requester, Pω/P0 = exp{λr + αrsi + βrsj + δr〈s(cj)〉}
from the estimation Pω/P0 = pω/p0 = Nω/N0, where, αr, βr, δr, and λr are parameters
corresponding to a requester. Once evaluated by fitting to the data from the experiment,
these parameters are used in numerical simulations of agents as shown in Fig. 3. A similar
scheme is used for data from acceptors, and the corresponding parameters αa, βa, δa, and
λa are evaluated.
III. RESULTS
A. Experiment
For our experiment we chose m = 3, i.e. colours red, green and blue. We conducted 5
games with l = 8 (n = 24) and 4 games with l = 10 (n = 30) with T = 21. The network was
taken as a square lattice with periodic boundary conditions and additional small world links.
For the initial condition, we tried to position the players in a graph coloured configuration,
that is, a subject with a given colour (say, red) is surrounded only by neighbours who have
a different colour (i.e. can not be red). All the games with 24 players and three out of the
four games with 30 players reached the desired outcome within 21 rounds. The evolution of
the clusters in one of the games with 24 players is shown in Fig. 1. This particular game
finished in 11 rounds. The games with 24 players took 9 rounds to complete on average,
and the completed games with 30 players took 16 rounds on average.
In general, all the games showed a fast initial growth in the sizes of the largest clusters.
After which the overall activity in terms of requesting and accepting decreased. In this phase
the players appeared to become “conscious” of the presence of players in the vicinity who
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FIG. 4. A typical time evolution of cluster sizes in a game with 30 players. Cluster
sizes of three randomly chosen players corresponding to the three colours (red - circles - player 21,
green - squares - player 11 and blue - triangles - player 14) are shown as the game progresses from
round 1 to round 21 (final round). The average collective progress (normalized value of the average
of the largest cluster sizes of the three colours, ACP; see Methods) is denoted by the dashed line.
The typical dynamics leading to a solution of the problem can be observed from the evolution of
the network, with an initial stage of fast progress (≈ 0.9 after 8 rounds), followed by a stagnation
regime where only a small number of location exchanges happen in the network, eventually leading
to the formation of the required three maximum-sized clusters. In the stagnation regime players
that are trapped in smaller clusters are facilitated to move such that they eventually merge with
larger clusters. For this particular game, we illustrate such an event occurring at round 14. The
configurations during rounds 14 and 15 are shown to the right with legends similar to those used in
Fig. 1. A player with a red colour and having cluster size of 1 (located at the bottom right corner
of the mesh at round 14) exchanges place with another player with colour green. As a result of
which the green cluster is fragmented. We observe this as the (chosen) green player’s cluster size
decreases from the maximum possible size (10) at round 14 to the minimum possible size (1) in
the next two rounds. However, the exchanges occurring after the 15th round allows the players
reorganize rather quickly to the desired configuration.
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were trapped in smaller clusters. This resulted most likely from the understanding of the
collective goal of the experiment. As a result players in larger clusters cooperated with the
isolated players and with players in small clusters by exchanging locations, which sometimes
caused fragmentation of the larger clusters. Such a case is shown in Fig. 4. The ACP and
the activity for the games are shown in Fig. 5. It is observed that the clusters become less
and less active as the game progresses in the wake of more passive requesting and accepting.
B. Numerical results
The fitting parameters are provided in table I. All the parameters turn out to be signif-
icantly different from zero with p < 0.01. As we have two sizes for the networks, for the
purpose of fitting we use cluster sizes that are scaled by the maximum cluster size, in such a
way that the cluster size variable varies between 0 and 1. As can be observed from table I,
the corresponding parameter values for the two sets (i.e. with 24 players and 30 players) are
mostly within the error bars. Therefore, using the data on all the 9 games we recalculate the
coefficients. Using these coefficients we simulate the model (see Fig. 3). With 24 agents and
500 simulations around 82% of the games reach a solution within 21 rounds; and the games
end with a mean ACP of 0.98. In case of 30 agents 66% of the games reach a solution and
the mean ACP is 0.95. In Fig. 5 we compare the ACP and the activity from the experiment
with those from the simulations (averaged over runs) using the model. Note, that in addition
to the probabilistic choice we use an additional rule that prevents exchanges between agents
belonging to different large clusters and increases the fraction of games completed. This
rule, however, has marginal effect on the ACP and the overall activity (see the following
section).
Interestingly, the fact that for requesters and acceptors the magnitudes of β and δ also
overlap within the error margins, could support our initial ansatz about the inclusion of
the term Uj = 〈s(cj)〉 − sj, as an independent variable, which would, however, diminish
the importance of sj as a separate independent variable. To investigate the importance of
such a term, we slightly modify our model by considering the magnitudes of δr and βr to be
equal. We simulate the model by varying δr (keeping the relation |δr| = |βr|) while taking
the values for the other coefficients from the table I. The resulting plot is shown in Fig. 6
(left). The plot shows that a larger δr (and βr) enhances the performance of the agents.
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FIG. 5. Comparison between experiments and simulations using the model for games with 24 and
30 players. (a and c) The average collective progress (normalized value of average of largest cluster
sizes corresponding to the three different colours) is plotted against the round number. The points
are binned values from the 5 experiments in the case of 24 players and from the 4 experiments
in the case of 30 players. The dashed lines are the result from simulations of the model with 500
runs. (b and d) The requesting and accepting activities in the games. The requesting activity is
measured as the the ratio between number of actual requests and the maximum possible requests
per round (circles). Similarly, the accepting activity is measured as the ratio between the number
of accepted requests and the total number of requests received (triangles). The dashed lines are
results from simulations. The error bars in the figures indicate the standard deviations.
Similarly, by varying αr in the model we benchmark the perception of risk in the human
subjects. Agents in the model are less likely to breakaway from clusters when αr is negative
and large. The Fig. 6 (right) shows a region near αr = −5 where the agents perform best.
13
Remarkably, we find that αr obtained from the experiment coincides with the optimal value.
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FIG. 6. Sensitivity of the requester model. Results from simulations of games with 30 agents
demonstrating the effect of variation of the parameters in the model corresponding to the requesters
on the average collective progress (red triangles) and the fraction of games completed (blue circles).
(Left) The parameters −βr and δr are assumed to be equal and simultaneously varied. The dashed
vertical line shows the location of −βr obtained from the experiment. (Right) The parameter αr
is varied. The dashed vertical line shows the location of αr obtained from the experiment. Each of
the points in the figures are averaged values from 500 runs. The shaded region in case of the ACP
represents the standard deviation associated with the points. In case of the completion fraction
the region indicates the Clopper-Pearson interval.
C. Model details
1. Stability rule for clusters
The expressions for probabilities in our basic model is a continuous function of the vari-
ables and is linear in terms of the argument. Actual human decision making can be quite
complex and more accurate description might require inclusion of non-linearities or discon-
tinuous dependence in terms of the variables. A lack of this in the basic model might have
resulted in the excess occurrence of requesting activity between large cluster sizes. In Fig. 7
we show this by comparing experiment and simulations for the games with 30 players. We
observed that in the model the presence of such activity can impact the completion of the
games. Requesting (and accepting) activity between players belonging to large clusters could
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be considered as detrimental if not useless in terms of reaching the solution. In case the
large clusters become unstable, the solution might not be reached. Therefore, in the sim-
ulations we prevent such requesting actions from taking place. We prohibit any requesting
activity between two agents having cluster size larger than 0.6l, where l is the maximum
possible value for a cluster size. The effect of such a rule can be investigated by introducing
a parameter f in the model such that 1 − f is the probability of allowing such an action.
With f = 0 we have the basic model and with f = 1 such requests are completely forbidden.
In Fig. S1 (SM) we show the effect of varying f on the ACP and the fraction of games
completed. For the results of simulations reported in the main text we take f = 1. Note,
that large clusters can still fragment when requests come from smaller clusters.
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FIG. 7. Requesting between large clusters in the games with 30 players – experiment (columns
on the left) and simulations without the stability rule (columns on the right). Requesters having
cluster sizes larger than 6 are considered (in this case the largest possible cluster size is 10). The
cases when such requesters sent requests to other players having cluster size larger than 6 are
counted. Also the cases when such requesters, though positioned in the neighbourhood of players
with cluster sizes larger than 6, did not sent any request to the latter are counted. The above
two counts are normalized by the total number of cases and compared. The plots reveal that
when simulating with the basic model, there is an excess of cases where players belonging to larger
clusters send request to players in larger clusters.
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2. Acceptance in the model
We observed that in the experiment the probability for a player to receive more than 2
requests in a given round was negligible. The dominating case was that of a single request
(70%) as can be observed from Fig. S2 (SM). Also, we found that when simultaneously two
requests were received, the choice of acceptance by the focal player was not significantly
influenced by the cluster sizes of the requesters (Fig. S2, right). Therefore, we modeled
acceptance by fitting our basic model (having the same structure as that of requesting) to
the dominating case of single requests. In the simulations when there were cases of multiple
requests we randomly considered one of the requests to be weighed against the decision of
not exchanging.
TABLE I. Values of parameters (coefficients and the intercept) derived from a logistic regression
on the data.
Focal Variable Coeff 24-player 30-player Joined
R
eq
u
es
te
r
Cluster size of requester αr −5.33± 0.71 −4.06± 0.52 −4.68± 0.41
Cluster size of requested neighbour βr −5.36± 1.58 −3.80± 1.01 −4.52± 0.84
Average cluster size (neighbour’s colour) δr 4.89± 1.89 2.91± 1.19 3.85± 0.99
(Intercept) λr 3.25± 0.59 2.61± 0.43 2.96± 0.34
A
cc
ep
to
r
Cluster size of acceptor αa −5.23± 0.83 −3.64± 0.54 −4.15± 0.45
Cluster size of requesting neighbor βa −5.14± 2.03 −4.53± 2.17 −4.39± 1.50
Average cluster size (neighbour’s colour) δa 5.32± 2.33 5.19± 2.30 4.76± 1.60
(Intercept) λa 3.25± 0.62 2.31± 0.40 2.70± 0.33
IV. DISCUSSION
Models and experiments based on game theory [36–38], especially those based on Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (PD) have been used extensively to study the formation of groups [39–42].
In this paradigm the existence of cooperative ties could lead to the formation of cohesive
groups, and the risk arises when players choose to defect. However, in the present frame-
work we interpret risk as an individual player’s decision to favour exchanging their current
locations. Unlike models based on PD where the payoff matrix would ideally determine the
amount of risk, in our case it is the propensity of an individual to relocate depending on his
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or her current cluster size. The dilemma arises from incomplete information, but the goal
is always collective, which is how to converge to a win-win situation in a limited number of
rounds.
The results from the experiment show, in general, that human players are able to process
complex information about their neighbourhood as well as take into account global infor-
mation about cluster sizes. It appears that that the players understand well the cooperative
setting of the game. In order to achieve the desired target the players tend to coordinate
their actions such that an exchange is done if it is mutually beneficial. The limited capacity
of processing the neighbourhood information is apparent in Fig. 6 (left). It is found that
larger magnitudes of the requester parameters of βr and δr would have signified a ‘wiser’
decision making and would have lead to faster progress in the game and better completion
rates. However, the fact that the values of the parameters (see table I) are significant with
appropriate signs, reflects the rationality in the choice of neighbours during the action of
request. The values of the acceptance parameters βa and δa would also signify rationality
although most of the times the acceptors receive only one request and the decision is limited
to agreeing or disagreeing to exchange places.
The dynamics of fragmentation and formation of clusters crucially depends on α (the
coefficient of cluster size of the focal player, the latter being a requester or an acceptor).
Whereas a negative value of α would make larger clusters stable, an extremely large mag-
nitude would make clusters inactive and render exchanges impossible. Interestingly, Fig. 6
(right) shows that for requesters the value of αr obtained from the experiment coincides with
the optimal value predicted from simulations using the model. This kind of balance could
result from the cooperative setting, which was well comprehended by the human subjects.
This is evidenced from the cluster fragmentation illustrated in the examples shown in Fig. 4.
Variation in αa does not seem to have much effect. Overall, the parameter values could be
reflecting as strategies of human individuals for engaging in coordination when risks are
present [43]. We have also examined the aspect of learning during sessions. To do this we
partitioned the decisions into categories and checked for significant differences between their
frequency distributions across the 9 sessions employing chi-squared tests. The differences
appeared to be non-significant (see the SM, smallest p-value is 0.07). Similarly, we have
extended the basic model to quantify the random effects resulting from the heterogeneity
between the participants. By using mixed effects logistic regressions we obtained standard
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deviations corresponding to the parameters of the original model (also provided in the SM).
The choice of the network was primarily guided by the issue of achieving convergence in a
limited number of rounds while maintaining a certain level of complexity. From each player’s
point of view, the accessible information comes from two sources: the local neighborhood
which describes the status of his/her neighbours, and the global information, which only
shows the overall progress towards the goal, without giving any hint about the configuration
of whole the network. Preliminary agent-based simulations on other topologies, for example
networks with structural communities [44], revealed extra complications and bottlenecks
for the players. In general, non-regular networks with varying neighborhoods are expected
to increase the difficulty for players trying to locate themselves and their neighbors in the
network. Also, frequent changes in the number of neighbors after each move would add up to
the mental processing required in each round. In this regard, the chosen small-world network
could have also taken different parameters (for example using as an initial backbone a ring of
size 3×10 instead of the chosen 6×5). Simulations allowed us to assess the possible layouts
and possible number of long distance links that could facilitate solving the problem in a
limited amount of time. The choice of three colors was, again, with the idea of keeping the
game complex enough without being extra demanding. We ran simulations of the game with
more colours, and it always required considerably more rounds to be completed. Besides,
increasing the number of colors would have increased the number of variables to deal with
for each player, requiring more time for processing information and make decisions.
We place the game in the broad context of group formation in social networks and tech-
nological networks. The experiment illustrates how individuals located on a network and
coordinating over links could achieve configurations that would in principle benefit all. In the
context of real-world social networks such dynamics would represent mutual enhancement
of individuals by the ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ of social capital [45–47] or the formation of
social coalitions [24, 25]. In a sense, the notion of a link between two nodes having the same
colour is comparable to the notion of an edge in a puzzle graph (representing a compatible
idea) in the recent formulation of ‘jigsaw percolation’ [48]. While an exchange of positions
between two individuals is to be understood primarily as simultaneous changes in the so-
cial space of the pair, such an activity could also be considered as an exchange of physical
locations of two individuals like that in a faculty exchange program between universities.
The desired nature of linking in the network with its underlying spatial structure can also
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be considered relevant in communication networks where the nodes are autonomous mobile
agents establishing peer-to-peer radio network. The theory of cooperative games has been
used to design deployment protocols of mobile agents where a coalition of agents would share
a certain frequency spectrum [49].
As we have performed the experiment with a limited number of subjects, the behaviour
captured via the coefficients in the model will reflect their particular characteristics and may
not be universal. For a different subject pool the individual coefficients may be different
while the overall behaviour may still be close to optimal. However, we have no reason to
suppose that the modelling scheme, maintaining the current level of complexity, would be
entirely different and that the current formulation would exert any special influence on our
inferences. Overall, we expect the broad principles revealed in this study to apply more
or less universally. Our decision making model not only serves the purpose of extracting
the behavioural aspects of real human subjects, it allows us to compare other possibilities
with respect to the parameter values. Although we do not perform an exhaustive search in
the parameter space, we gain sufficient insight into human behaviour when we find faster
convergence for some parameters. Our goal in the near future is to perform experiments
with artificial agents or bots playing with humans [6, 7]. Agents formulated using the
model can mirror the typicalities of human behaviour who are actually willing to cooperate
during tasks that require collective coordination [1]. Such agents may be used to test the
collective performance in human-agent hybrid systems where humans are guided to make
decisions based on less collective or selfish motivations. For instance, it would be interesting
to compare the outcomes from games where the individual groups are entirely constituted
by humans or bots, with games where groups are formed by mixing humans and bots.
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Supplementary Material
S1. MODEL DETAILS
The Fig. S1 illustrates the stability rule implemented in the Model (main text). The
Fig. S2 shows the statistics of simultaneous requests and the nature of acceptances.
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FIG. S1. The effect of the stability rule on the average collective progress (left) and the fraction
of games completed (right). The parameter f allows us to scan between the limits of having no
stability rule (f = 0) and having absolute implementation of the rule (f = 1).
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FIG. S2. (Left) The distribution of the number of simultaneous requests received by a player.
(Right) The distribution of accepted requests when receiving two simultaneous requests, where
S1 denotes the cluster size of the selected requester and S2 denotes the cluster size of the denied
requester.
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TABLE S2. Distribution of strategies in different sets of games are tested for difference using the
Pearson’s chi-squared test.
Groups Requester Acceptor
df χ2 p-value χ2 p-value
All 9 games 56 67.01 0.15 67.63 0.14
Grp-1=g1+g2+g3
Grp-2=g5+g7+g6
Grp-3=g7+g8+g9
14 20.37 0.12 16.26 0.30
Grp-1=g1+g2+g3+g4+g5
Grp-2=g6+g7+g8+g9
7 13.17 0.07 8.54 0.29
S2. TESTING FOR LEARNING DURING GAMES
The model is able to describe (provide probabilities on) the choices made by the players in
terms of the three variables of the system – (i) cluster size of the focal player, si , (ii) cluster
size of the neighbour to whom the request is made or whose request is received, sj , and (iii)
the average of the cluster sizes of the number of neighbours ni(cj) of player i that have the
same colour as j, 〈s(cj)〉. To investigate whether the subjects were learning and changing
their preferences over the span of the 9 games, we utilize the aforementioned information
and first categorize the observed decisions in terms of the three variables si, sj, and 〈s(cj)〉.
We divide the 3-dimensional decision space into octants (si R 0.5, sj R 0.5, 〈s(cj)〉 R 0.5)
and count the number of choices in each of these 8 octants (categories) in a given game. We
then compare the distribution of the choices across the 9 different games. The distribution
of choices for requesters and acceptors are shown in Fig. S3 and Fig. S4, respectively. We
compare the distribution of counts using the Pearson’s chi-squared test. We also clustered
the games into three (games 1 to 3, 4 to 6, and 7 to 9) and two (games 1 to 5, and 6 to
9) sets by aggregating the counts of the individual games. In Table S2 we show the results
the test with the strategy being the categorical variable and the null hypothesis being that
there is no difference between the distribution of strategy across the groups (games) [1]. We
find that p-values are not small enough to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we conclude
that no significant learning behaviour was observed.
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FIG. S3. Requesting decisions of the subjects on each one of the 9 games. The decisions are
categorized into 8 different strategies and the fraction of cases in each strategy is shown for each
game. The counts for the decisions in a given game is normalized using the total decisions in the
game.
S3. TESTING FOR BEHAVIOURAL HETEROGENEITY
Below we provide a method to study and model the aspect of heterogeneity among agents.
In the basic modelling scheme (refer to the main text, Model section) we cast the model
in the form of a logistic regression that learn the parameters α, β and δ from the data.
We extend the scheme to consider mixed effects logistic regression [2], where an additional
variable for subjects account for random effects (heterogeneity). We consider the following
four models with different levels of complexity that we implement using an R programming
package for generalized linear mixed models [3]:
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FIG. S4. Accepting decisions of the subjects during the 9 games. The decisions are categorized
into 8 different strategies and the fraction of cases in each strategy is shown for the different games.
Model-0: logit(P (m,k)ω /P
(m,k)
0 ) = λ+ αs
(m,k)
i + βs
(m,k)
j + δ〈s(cj)〉(m,k)
Model-1: logit(P (m,k)ω /P
(m,k)
0 ) = (λ+ λm) + αs
(m,k)
i + βs
(m,k)
j + δ〈s(cj)〉(m,k)
Model-2: logit(P (m,k)ω /P
(m,k)
0 ) = λ+ (α + αm)s
(m,k)
i + (β + βm)s
(m,k)
j + (δ + δm)〈s(cj)〉(m,k)
Model-3: logit(P (m,k)ω /P
(m,k)
0 ) = (λ+ λm) + (α + αm)s
(m,k)
i + (β + βm)s
(m,k)
j + (δ + δm)〈s(cj)〉(m,k).
In the above equations the superscript (m, k) refers to the k-th observation for the m-th
subject in a game. Model-0 is the basic model used without random effects. The intercept λm
and the coefficients αm, βm and δm account for random effects due to the subjects. Model-
1 is the random intercept model assuming that different subjects tend to have different
intercepts and that slopes do not differ. Model-2 ignores random effects in the intercept and
considers the slopes. Model-3 is a combination of Model-1 and Model-2. Using the data from
the requesters’ decisions we fit the models. In table S3 we provide the intercepts, coefficients
and their standard deviations obtained from the models (all the coefficients are significant
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TABLE S3. Results from mixed effects logistic regression models from the data of the requesters.
The intercepts, coefficients and their standard deviations obtained from the models are shown.
Model-0 does not have any mixed effects. Feature scaling of the input to models have been per-
formed to enhance the optimization.
Model λ α β δ σλ σα σβ σδ
Model-0 -0.97 -1.36 -1.55 1.05
Model-1 -1.12 -1.65 -1.65 1.13 1.08
Model-2 -1.05 -1.72 -1.71 1.07 0.86 0.41 0.61
Model-3 -1.21 -1.99 -1.93 1.17 1.17 0.87 0.47 0.52
with, p-value ≤0.001). An Anova test shows that out of the 4 models, Model-1 and Model-
3 are the best candidates (AIC'572 and p <0.001). We also considered models of higher
complexity, for instance, with correlated intercepts and slopes, but on these the optimization
method failed to converge. Using this scheme we are able to obtain the standard deviations of
the intercepts and coefficients that quantify the heterogeneity of the subjects. In principle,
the standard deviations can be used for generating randomly distributed intercepts and
coefficients in the agent-based model. In the case of the acceptors the sparseness of the
data (accepting instances are much lower than requesting instances) the fits could not be
performed. However, from the similarity between requesting and accepting coefficients,
as observed in Table-1 of the main text, we may consider the standard deviations in the
accepting coefficients to be of similar magnitude.
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S4. VISUAL PRESENTATION GIVEN TO PARTICIPANTS BEFORE THE EX-
PERIMENT
Game: Group formation
2 / 22
Group formation
● Each player has one of 3 colors and occupies 
a node in the network (3x10=30 players).
● Players can move on the network by 
exchanging places with players of different 
color.
● Goal: All nodes of the same color get 
connected (to form groups or clusters)
● Game ends after 21 rounds, or when every 
player is in a group of size 10.
3 / 22
Network
4 / 22
Network: Clusters
5 / 22
End of game 
6 / 22
End of game
FIG. S5. Slides 1-6 of the visual material (presentation) given to the participants before the
experiment to introduce them to rules, goal and dynamics of the game on which they participated.
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End of game
8 / 22
What you see
● You occupy a node and you see: 
1. Your position 
2. Your cluster‘s size (group size).
3. Neighbours: Players 
connected to you - denoted by 
their place and clustersize in 
brackets (example: 6(3))
4. Dark gray lines are links to 
nodes of your own color. These 
nodes cannot be requested by 
you.
5. Pink lines are links to nodes 
with other colors. These nodes can 
be requested by you.
9 / 22
Gameplay
● Each round consists of 3 phases:
– Requesting (A color, e.g. BLUE sends 
requests to exchange places)
– Accepting (Other colors, RED  & GREEN)
– End of round (Network after the round)
● Each different round begins by a different 
colour getting chance to send requests.
● Players can request only to their neighbors to 
exchange places.
● Requested players can accept any received 
request to exhange OR keep their place.
10 / 22
Requesting stage
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Requesting stage
● Make a request OR keep your place.
● Different nodes to request. After choosing you 
can confirm your choice.
12 / 22
Requesting stage
● Make a request OR keep your place.
● Different nodes to request. After choosing you 
can confirm your choice.
FIG. S6. Slides 13-18 of the visual material (presentation) given to the participants.
30
13 / 22
Accepting stage
14 / 22
Accepting stage
● Time to make a choice, otherwise keeps place
● Different requests are shown. After choosing 
you can confirm your choice and proceed 
onward.
15 / 22
Accepting stage
● Limited time to make a choice, otherwise you 
keep your place
● Different requests are shown. After choosing 
you can confirm your choice and proceed 
onward.
16 / 22
Accepting stage
17 / 22
End of round
18 / 22
Other information you have
● The size of the 
biggest cluster of 
each color
● Progress:  
average of these 
three biggest 
clusters divided 
by 10
Maximum cluster sizes: red: 8, yellow: 7, blue: 4
FIG. S7. Slides 19-22 of the visual material (presentation) given to the participants.
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Rewarding
● You get 1 ticket for attending the session
● Additional tickets are calculated from the 
performance:
– The final progress of a game is compared 
to the progress of AI playing with random 
logic on the same network (49,03%) and 
added to the sum.
– The sum is then divided by the maximum 
performance and multiplied by 4.
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The experiment
● Communication is not allowed during the 
game.
● Do not look at other screens!
● Do not close your browser/tab!
● 2 short breaks during the session.
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The experiment
● Take your time to make your choices, but 
remember the time limit.
● REMEMBER: This game is a team effort! 
The progress is collective!
● Follow the instructions and have fun!
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Questions?
● We'll start by playing a short practice game 
with longer timeouts.
● This game will not affect the rewards.
● Please read and sign the consent form on 
your table.
FIG. S8. Slides 7-12 of the visual material (presentation) given to the participants.
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